

DESIGNING OUT  
**CRIME**



## Preface

### Why Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG)?

The purpose of this document is to give guidance on the design and layout of the physical environment so as to reduce crime, the fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour. It seeks to emphasise the need to make security an inherent part of the design process, particularly in its early phases (once a development has been completed, the main opportunity for the inclusion of crime prevention measures has been lost).

To this end, it encourages attractive, imaginative and feasible solutions that reduce the likelihood of crime occurring but at the same time provide for a high quality environment. What it does not seek to do is to encourage the products of bad design - desolate, sterile and unattractive environments that make law abiding citizens feel uncomfortable to live and work in. It is aimed primarily at designers and developers involved in the design of large developments (including those working within the public sphere); however, many of its principles can be applied also to small and existing developments.

The advice is by no means exhaustive but it does provide a starting point upon which designers can evolve their ideas. Furthermore, developers and designers should recognise that the Council is obliged under The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, to consider the crime and disorder implications within all planning applications. As such, crime and security issues (along with others) can represent material considerations in determining certain applications. Pre-planning application discussions with the Council are, therefore, encouraged.

Salford City Council adopted this document as Supplementary Planning Guidance, following statutory public consultation, on 21 March 2002. A statement of the consultation undertaken, the representations received and the local authority's response to those representations is available on request.



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# 1. Introduction

## Designing out Crime

1.1 Crime and the fear of crime have a considerable impact on both the life of individuals and their wider community. It is well documented that good planning and design have a major role to play in reducing crime and thus people's fear of it.

## Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

1.2 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design is an approach to crime prevention which aims to design a physical environment that positively influences human behaviour. Its goal is to make people feel safe within their built environment and, conversely, make criminals feel at risk and therefore less inclined to commit crime.

1.3 The approach has at its core the following principles: defensible space; defined areas of influence (territoriality); and surveillance.

## Defensible Space



*Semi private zone demarcated by a change in road surface along with symbolic pillars and railings.*

1.4 The idea behind defensible space is that the environment is divided into clearly defined areas which are either public, semi-private or private zones. Public zones are generally open to

anyone and as such represent the least secure of the three zones, particularly when they are located near to a building (as in the case of a footpath). Semi-private zones serve to create a buffer between public and private areas. They are accessible to the public but design features establish definite transitional boundaries between the zones. A courtyard is an example of a semi-private zone. Private zones are areas of restricted entry. Access is controlled and limited to specific individuals or groups. An example of a private zone is a private residence.

1.5 Divisions between zones are usually defined by some type of barrier which can be either physical or symbolic. For example, a physical barrier can simply be a strong fence or some sort of landscaping (this landscaping should not be so dense as to provide a hiding place for criminals). A symbolic barrier can be many things be it a flower bed or simply a change of material on a footpath. The important requirement is that people are left in no doubt that a transition between zones has occurred.

## Defined Area of Influence (Territoriality)

1.6 Territoriality is fostered by architecture that allows for easy



*Signs indicating an area as the exclusive domain of residents.*

identification of certain areas as the exclusive domain of a particular group or individual. A sense of pride and ownership is usually evident (although ownership in this context does not necessarily mean legal ownership). It can be a perceived ownership that is based on an individual's/group's relationship with the environment. Local children may, for example, feel they "own" a play area simply because they regularly use it.

## Surveillance

1.7 Surveillance is the primary weapon in the protection of a defensible space. Criminals feel least comfortable in environments where legitimate users of a space or building have a high degree of visual control. In other words, their criminal activity can be easily witnessed.

1.8 Surveillance can take two forms: informal and formal. Informal surveillance arises where designers minimise visual obstacles and eliminate places of concealment. Such open designs also encourage use of a particular area given that people feel safer in places where they can see and be seen. Formal surveillance measures are employed when natural surveillance alone cannot sufficiently protect an area. Measures might include CCTV and security patrols and are often used in public areas of buildings accessible after business hours.

1.9 Generally, surveillance will be improved if greater use is made of an area or building. This can be achieved through a combination of high quality design, encouraging mixed use of space and ensuring access to facilities. Designs that serve to socially / physically

2 exclude individuals or groups who have


a legitimate right to use an area or building should be avoided.

## 2. The Need for an Integrated / Multi Agency Approach

2.1 Measures that reduce crime go well beyond land-use planning. While this SPG focuses on land-use planning, it does have regard to the need for an integrated approach that brings together central government, the Council and other agencies with an interest in crime prevention and community safety. To this end, Salford City Council, the Greater Manchester Police and the Greater Manchester County Fire Service have, along with other partners, formed the Salford Crime Reduction Partnership. This Partnership is dedicated to delivering an agreed Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy for people living and working in the city. The Council's aim, therefore, is that this SPG will play some part in that comprehensive strategy to reduce crime. It is, however, recognised that crime will only be truly addressed through dealing with its root causes.

## Government Advice

2.2 Government advice on crime prevention matters and planning is contained in **Circular 5/94** (Planning Out Crime). This Circular acknowledges that successful crime prevention depends upon a wide range of measures, but that the planning system can be an important factor. In this context the Circular makes it clear that crime prevention can be a material consideration when planning applications are being determined. It also focuses attention on the importance and value of identifying opportunities to reduce crime through discussions that



authorities have with developers and their designers at the outset of the design process.

2.3 Government guidance has also come in the form of **Planning Policy Guidance Note No.1** (General Policy and Principles) which states that crime prevention is one of the social considerations that must be regarded in the formulation and adoption of planning policies and development plans. PPG1 also emphasises the need for good design in that it serves to create a sustainable, attractive environment that reinforces civic pride and a sense of place. In other words, good design will encourage legitimate use of a particular building or space thus reducing the likelihood of criminal activity.

**2.4 Planning Policy Guidance Note 3**, while dealing specifically with housing issues, also states that local planning authorities should adopt policies that “promote designs and layouts which are safe and take account of public health, crime prevention and community safety considerations”. To this end, planning authorities should encourage a mixture of land uses with good design being of central importance.

### Salford City Council's Unitary Development Plan\*

2.5 Policy DEV4. states:

*“The City Council will encourage greater consideration of crime prevention and personal and property security in the design of new development and the improvement of existing buildings and land. In particular, the City Council will have regard to:*

- a) *the choice of external finishes and detailing of the building;*
- b) *the relationship of car parking to buildings, especially entrances, and to pedestrian circulation within the site;*
- c) *the provision of security features;*
- d) *the layout of hard and soft landscaped areas;*
- e) *the position and height of fencing and gates, and*
- f) *external lighting.”*

*\* The current adopted plan is in the process of being reviewed. Policy DEV4 may therefore change.*

2.6 It should be noted that the Council is committed to encouraging high quality developments which incorporate appropriately designed security features. It recognises, however that a balance has to be struck between this goal and other considerations such as fire safety, convenience and commercial requirements.

## 3. Designing Out Crime in Residential Areas

3.1 The importance of providing people with a secure residential environment cannot be overstated. Land use planning can play its part in achieving this sense of security by promoting good layout and design.

### Layout

3.2 New developments should ensure that the front of dwellings face onto their most public side - for example, a road. Where possible, rear gardens/yards should back on to land or buildings that are themselves secure.

3.3 All space within a development should be properly managed and





*Residential development indicating the good practice of the front of dwellings facing their most public side.*

maintained and this should be reflected in designs. Neglected land (particularly where its ownership is ambiguous) is likely to attract unsociable or criminal activity. Where this problem exists on an established development, steps should be taken to improve the design and maintenance of the land.

3.4 Developments, where possible, should incorporate a mixture of use, size and tenure. Carefully integrating and balancing a mixture of uses within residential layouts, for example, can have a positive effect on them. Including a mixture of local shopping, leisure, work and community facilities served by good public transport, can mean that residential areas benefit from greater surveillance by those using the various facilities. It also makes for more sustainable developments.

3.5 Residential layouts that encourage walking and cycling, and which allow for easy access by the provision of secure through-routes, also provide for greater natural surveillance. Permeable layouts linked to public transport create a greater flow of people through them and thereby discourage criminal activity.

## Building design

3.6 Buildings should be of a design that ensures that surveillance of the public realm is maximised. Buildings on a corner, for example, should be designed to provide surveillance on all public sides.



*This building is designed with windows on both the front and side elevations so as to afford good surveillance*

3.7 Each dwelling, where possible, should have a private entrance from the street. If communal entrances are unavoidable, access should be restricted to residents and authorised visitors. It is also worth investigating the feasibility of an intercom system. Entrances to dwellings should be visible from windows within the dwelling so as to aid identification of callers. Building extensions should neither obscure entrances or facilitate easy access to upper floor windows.

## Footpaths and Walkways

3.8 The number and design of access routes through a development can determine whether or not it will be susceptible to crime. Footpaths and walkways, therefore, need to be carefully planned. Both need to take account of where users want to go and therefore ideally should:

- be as short and direct as possible;
- be as wide as possible;



*An example of good footpath design which is short, direct, well lit and open to surveillance.*

- have barriers incorporated where necessary to prevent vehicular access;
- be under surveillance from surrounding buildings;
- be located so as to encourage increased pedestrian use;
- be maintained and clearly signposted;
- have clear vision into, along and out of the footpath;
- be designed to incorporate boundary treatment which allows views from the footpath and vice versa where the issue of privacy is not of prime concern;
- be illuminated to a uniform level to allow easy recognition of other people but not dazzle drivers;

3.9 Footpaths and walkways to be avoided are those:

- with sharp corners, tunnels or places of concealment;
- to the rear of dwellings or buildings;
- obscured by planting/landscaping;
- with narrow sections and enclosed by high walls;

## Lighting

3.10 Lighting should meet the standards as stipulated in **BS 5489 part 3/2**. Shadowed areas should be avoided and care should be taken in regard to the reflective nature of some surfaces. It is recommended that in residential areas the lighting levels should be a minimum of 2.5 lux with an average of 6.0 lux at ground level.

## Traffic Calming

3.11 The main purpose of traffic calming is to improve traffic and pedestrian safety, but it can also have a positive effect in reducing crime. If designed correctly, calming measures can also create a sense of ownership by identifying territorial boundaries.




*Communal residential parking. This example is well lit and overlooked.*

Chicanes for example, effectively section off different parts of a street or road - particularly if they are appropriately landscaped.

## Parking

3.12 The Council acknowledges that secure car parking is one of the most important factors in an individual's choice of home. Parking areas do, however, use up a high proportion of urban land, and in keeping with current government thinking, the Council will in certain cases, and where practicable, encourage car free or virtually car free developments (mixed use developments, for example have the potential to reduce car usage). Where parking is considered necessary, designers and developers should follow the advice below.



3.13 In curtilage parking should be secured with appropriate fencing/walls and, where necessary, have a lockable gate. If in curtilage parking is not possible, then parking facilities should be provided as close as possible to the properties served.

3.14 Parking courts can have a propensity to encourage crime. Where they are included in any design, they should ideally have restricted access and be controlled by residents. Furthermore, surveillance from owners' properties should be unimpeded.

3.15 Wherever possible, parking areas should be visible from at least one window of an adjacent property. Where on street parking is provided, thought should be given to distinguishing between the highway and the parking area by use of differing materials - this will strengthen a sense of ownership. If a dwelling includes a garage, it should be positioned so as not to impair surveillance.

## Access and Private Space

### 3.16

Private space must be well defined. Front gardens with a low wall and railings on top, or alternatively, a low fence or hedge, will serve to increase a sense of ownership.



*A low wall with railings on top makes for a well defined private space. Low lying shrubs provide an extra buffer.*

6

All parts of a property's curtilage should be accessible from within the property. Grounds around blocks of flats should be enclosed and have lockable gates with access restricted to residents. As a further measure, ground floor flats could have the area in front of them enclosed as a garden.



*Secure grounds around a block of flats.*

3.17 Rear gardens should be segregated from the front of a property. This will impede burglars from gaining access to the back of properties where there is usually less surveillance. Rear gardens that interlock with adjacent gardens provide the best security. Where possible, they should be protected by a fence that is not less than 1800mm high.

3.18 Where terraced housing is concerned, rear alleys serving the backs of properties should be avoided. However, if they are deemed necessary, alleys should be kept short (that is, a number of short alleys serving a limited number of dwellings as opposed to one long alley). The gating of such alleys should also be considered but the design needs to be of a kind that does not call for complicated manipulation in the event of residents having to flee from a fire, or the Fire Service having to perform a rescue. The Fire Service also advises that if a gate is deemed necessary, the restriction of access can

be compensated for by dwellings having early fire detection systems and residents being educated in regard to fire safety. Gates (at the alley entrance) should be flush with the building line as recesses can act as hiding places for criminals. They should be designed so as to make scaling them difficult and their locks should be protected so as to deter tampering and vandalism. Finally, gates should be designed in such a way that they maintain views along the alley - in other words, they should not be solid.

### Parks and Public Open Spaces



*A public open space overlooked by adjacent dwellings.*

3.19 New developments adjacent to parks and open spaces, should be designed to maximise surveillance of these areas. Landscaping within parks and open spaces should not block the view of pedestrian routes from surrounding properties. Of particular importance, is the need to prevent open space going into decline as this will attract misuse - e.g. fly tipping or drug misuse. Vehicular access should be restricted to maintenance and emergency service vehicles. Gates or collapsible bollards can provide barriers to unauthorised entry, particularly where "car dumping" is a problem.

## 4. Commercial Areas

### Siting and Layout

4.1 As with residential dwellings, commercial buildings should be orientated so that all means of access are subject to some form of surveillance. Where delivery areas are positioned at the rear of the development they should have restricted and gated access.

### Building Design

4.2 To protect buildings from external attack, appropriately designed barriers and bollards can be installed (see below). Other measures to deter attack include stall-risers, boulders, and water features. Protection from illegal access via the roof can be enhanced by creating deep overhanging eaves, positioning piping internally and avoiding roof lights (if fitted, however, grills should also be attached).

4.3 Within buildings and where possible, sensitive areas with expensive equipment should be located on upper floors. Access into the building can be controlled by manned security, intercom facilities, CCTV (see below), key pads and magnetic access control systems.

### Lighting

4.4 Premises and car parks should be adequately lit. Lighting should be provided to the levels described in **BS 5489 Part 9, table 5**, (which requires a minimum of 5.0 lux and an average of 15.0 lux) and should be operated dusk to dawn.

4.5 Other types of lighting including systems controlled by time switches and passive infra red (PIR) movement detectors, should be considered. Care should be taken to ensure that



landscaping does not obscure lights. Units should be robust to ward off vandalism and positioned so as to make tampering difficult.

### Boundary Treatment

4.6 Railings can either be erected as a stand alone feature or be installed on top of a brick wall. If the latter option is selected, the railings should be flush with the edge of the wall and there should be no gap between each. Furthermore, railing features should not provide a ladder like foothold to afford criminals a means of scaling them. Defensible planting next to a wall can act as a buffer between the public realm and the boundary. Species that provide this additional barrier include holly, hawthorn, firethorn and blackthorn. Planting patterns should not make for easy hiding places for criminals.



*Railings and landscaping clearly indicate the boundary between the public and private realm*

4.7 Perimeter gates should be the same height as the boundary fence and incorporate anti-lift hinges. Their design should make them difficult to climb. If feasible, they should either be manned or be controlled by authorised personnel - for example, with a lock and key system or an electronically operated "fob" system.

8

### Parking

4.8 Private non-residential parking fuels unsustainable traffic growth. In an attempt to stem this growth and its accompanying problems such as traffic



*This car park benefits from good natural surveillance, appropriate landscaping and fencing.*

congestion and environmental deterioration, the Council will actively promote use of public transport, cycling and walking as means for people to reach work. Where parking is designed into a commercial development, the following advice should be taken on board:

- parking areas should be located where there is scope for natural surveillance;
- landscaping should be designed so as to afford views across the car park;
- access to car parking areas should be controlled and, if possible, also patrolled;
- walls and fences within a car park should not be more than 1000mm high;
- car parking bays themselves should be clearly marked.



## Town Centres

4.9 As many commercial buildings are located in town centres, and consequently are often subject to criminal attack and damage, particular care should be taken in protecting property. The Council will, therefore, encourage businesses to work together in order to produce a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to security that might include some or all of the approaches as set out below.

4.10 The Council will in appropriate cases encourage a mix of uses that include, for example, dwellings over shops alongside high street restaurants. Such a mix can lead to more vibrant town centres that are less attractive to burglars and vandals.

4.11 Similarly, in appropriate cases, shopping malls (whether they be located in town centres or elsewhere) should have a greater mix of uses that attract people at night thus making them less vulnerable to crime.

4.12 It is recognised, however, that town centre businesses, whether they are in locations with a mix of uses or not, can still be subject to crime perpetrated by the determined criminal. Given this, there are a number of measures which can be taken to protect premises.




## Windows

4.13 Businesses can be particularly vulnerable to burglary and vandalism outside opening hours. Where windows exist or are planned, thought should be given to fitting laminated glass to those on the ground floor. In situations that demand it, beading should be fitted internally and be of a type that is not vulnerable to tampering.

## Shutters

4.14 Where crime is particularly pronounced, shutters can be considered. The design of such shutters is, however, very important. Solid, faceless aluminium/steel shutters serve only to engender a fortress type atmosphere and provide a vulnerable target for graffiti. The Council will, therefore, normally require that shutters are powder coated and perforated. Apart from being more attractive, such shutters if internally illuminated, allow for surveillance from the street. External shutters that stand proud of the front of buildings, will not be encouraged. The Council will view more favourably designs that either incorporate shutters that are fitted internally, or alternatively, have at least their boxes fitted internally or behind a fascia sign.

### Advice on Shutter Design (External Fitting)



## Bollards



*Bollards protecting high street shops*

4.15 In some circumstances the positioning of bollards in front of premises might be necessary in order to combat the threat of ram raiding. Should the Council deem bollards appropriate, it will normally expect them to be of a design that is both in keeping with their intended location and does not create a danger for pedestrians. Furthermore, the Council would encourage comprehensive schemes that are designed to protect a number of premises as opposed to one.

## CCTV

4.16 CCTV of itself will not reduce crime. It must form part of a package of measures that serve to make for an integrated and collective approach. Issues such as civil liberties and local acceptance also need to be taken into account when designing a CCTV scheme. This said, CCTV systems



*An example of monitored CCTV alongside effective street lighting*

can minimise disturbance, vandalism and shoplifting but they must be monitored for them to be effective. Systems should also have a response capability such as “voice over” whereby a person monitoring the system can warn off the would-be criminal. Care should be taken with the positioning of trees as they can obscure the view of cameras particularly when in leaf. Clear stemmed trees afford the best visibility.

## 5. Further Help and Advice

5.1 This advice note has been written primarily to provide guidance for developers and their agents. It outlines some of the measures that can be incorporated into designs to deter criminal activity. Set out below, however, are agencies/organisations that will give further free professional advice.

### Architectural Liaison Unit (ALU)

5.2 The ALU is based within the Greater Manchester Police Force but its officers are recruited from the construction industry professions. Each receives specialist training in criminology, risk management and crime reduction strategies. This training allows officers to give advice on designing out crime for existing, proposed and refurbished developments.

5.3 In particular, officers can also advise on both the Secured By Design and Secured Car Park award schemes. These schemes encourage designers and developers to apply police recommendations for residential, commercial and car parking developments. Research shows that crime can be substantially reduced (with little extra cost) by introducing Secured by Design recommendations during the

early design and planning stages of a development. A developer who receives one or both of these awards can subsequently use the "Secured By Design" logo in their promotional literature.

### The Business Security Co-ordinator (BSC)

5.4 The BSC is responsible for co-ordinating all aspects of business security and safety matters. Working closely with the ALU and the City Council, the BSC can offer the following services:

- security surveys;
- advice on available grants;
- provision of support services for industrial and commercial Risk Management Groups/Business Watch Schemes;
- advice on the best products and practices in all aspects of security.

### Crime Reduction Advisors - Greater Manchester Police (CRAs)

5.5 The CRAs provide advice upon the setting of strategies that address the causes or common characteristics of policing problems, in order to reduce situational and sociological crime and disorder.

5.6 They keep abreast of crime reduction techniques and identify "what works" in the field of crime reduction.

5.7 The CRA's also promote Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) both internally and externally. They are able to advise on specialist issues such as CCTV, target hardening and changing crime trends.

5.8 Finally, they establish links with

local crime and disorder partnerships, to promote and advise on crime reduction issues.

### Community Fire Safety Team (CFST)

5.9 The CFST can offer advice on the implications of security measures in relation to fire safety.

### Salford City Council's Development Control Section

5.10 Pre-application advice is also available from the Council's Development Control Section. Officers will be able to assist developers and their agents both on security and other material matters relating to a proposed application.

## 6. Contact Addresses/ Numbers

### The Architectural Liaison Unit

Community Affairs Branch  
Greater Manchester Police  
Chester House  
Boyer Street  
Manchester  
M16 0RE

Tel: 0161 856 2255

### The Business Security Co-ordinator

Salford Community Safety Unit  
Civic Centre  
Chorley Road  
Swinton  
Salford  
M27 2AD

Tel: 0161 793 3576  
Fax: 0161 793 3579



## The Crime Reduction Advisors

Tel: 0161 856 5446  
0161 856 5254

## The Community Fire Safety Team (Salford Area)

West Area Headquarters  
Moor Lane  
Bolton

Tel: 01204 905141

## Salford City Council

Development Control Section  
Civic Centre  
Chorley Road  
Swinton  
Salford  
M27 2AD

Tel: 0161 794 4711

## 7. Further Information

Salford's Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy.

City of Salford Unitary Development Plan. (Adopted November 1995, now in the process of review).

"Crime Prevention" (Circular 1/84 issued jointly by the Home Office, DES, DoE, DHSS and the Welsh Office, 1984).

Planning Out Crime  
(DOE Circular 5/94)

C.O.P. Monitoring and Operation of CCTV (Home Office)

Home Office paper Briefing Note (7/00) Secured By Design in West Yorkshire - "An evaluation of Secured by Design within West Yorkshire."

Planning Policy Guidance Note 1: - "General Policy and Principles" (DoE 1997).

Planning Policy Guidance Note 3: Housing.

Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Manual: Designing Out Crime. Towards an Urban Renaissance: Urban Task Force, June 1999



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